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Like economic history, the history of economic thought (HET) investigates economic issues in 
long-run perspective. Yet the two fields are distinct and should not be confounded: HET does not 
study economic facts such as the 1929 financial crisis but rather economic theories and economic 
literature. It focuses on the historical roots of economic ideas and takes into account a wide array 
of schools of thought; in conjunction with pure theory and the history of facts, it constitutes part 
of a comprehensive approach to the study of the economic bases of modern societies. Examples 
of research questions in HET include how economic issues (say, unemployment or growth) have 
been dealt with at different points in time, what intellectual debates they have stimulated, and 
what solutions have been concocted; how the meaning and interpretation of economic concepts 
such as involuntary unemployment or market equilibrium may have changed over time and how 
they have affected policy debates; and whether and how exchanges with neighboring disciplines 
or with currents of thought in philosophy have exerted an impact on the development of 
economics. 
A variety of approaches to the study of HET coexist, but it is possible to identify two 
broad tendencies into which most of them would fit: one more “theory oriented,” the other more 
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“history oriented.” The theory-oriented approach, often referred to as history of analysis, 
emphasizes continuity between present and past reflection, so that earlier writers are seen as a 
source of inspiration that may assist today’s researchers in devising new solutions to current 
theoretical questions. Because economics is an approach to the study of society that endeavors to 
look beneath context-specific factors to discover underlying regularities in the behavior of 
individuals and communities, older economists who have already identified some of these 
regularities can provide useful insight despite the time distance that separates them from us. 
Earlier ideas have remained partly underdeveloped, and getting back to them can potentially 
suggest new directions for research. For some scholars, this means reviving alternative 
explanations and interpretations of economic phenomena, in a critical perspective with respect to 
any consensus that might exist today. In line with this methodological stance, historians of 
analysis primarily rely on the conceptual tools of contemporary economic theory. 
In contrast, the history-oriented approach emphasizes discontinuity between different 
stages of development in economics and the specificities of each of them. The idea is that an 
economic theory is embedded in its historical, sociopolitical, and institutional environment and 
constitutes a response to the problems of the day, so that it is incorrect to understand it in 
abstraction from them. Specifically, a “retrospective” interpretation of past economic theories in 
light of the knowledge that has been subsequently acquired is impoverishing as it tends to present 
them all as imperfect, preliminary drafts of today’s supposedly superior models. Instead, it is 
essential to detail the context in which an older theory emerged, and useful insight may come 
from historical techniques such as archival work, biographies, and oral history. This approach 
emphasizes the relative character of economic theories and their connections to politics and 
society at large. Among scholars who work along these lines, a large group has developed a close 
association with, and adopted methods of, science studies, in some cases with a critical 
perspective toward economics. 
While the two above-outlined approaches are the object of recurrent and sometimes lively 
controversies within the HET community,1 many scholars are in fact aware that each has both 
strengths and weaknesses and try to combine the two in their research. Still other approaches may 
be occasionally present, particularly the case of research at the crossroads between HET and the 
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philosophy or methodology of economics. 
What follows is a brief overview of the main areas of research in HET that also 
correspond to a classic division of phases of development of the economics discipline from its 
origins to its present state. Following the Journal of Economic Literature classification, the 
evolution of economics has been subdivided into two phases—namely, HET through 1925 and 
HET since 1925; a shorter third part on recent developments has been added to this basic scheme. 
There is obviously insufficient room to cover all aspects of the intellectual reflection in 
economics over such a long time span. For this reason, the presentation is limited to a sketch of 
what each period contributed to the study of three foundational issues in economics—namely, the 
theory of individual economic behavior, the market mechanism as a coordinating device, and the 
respective roles of markets and governments in the regulation of economic systems. Reflection 
on these issues has progressively formed economists’ understanding of society and presently 
allows applications to a broad range of social phenomena, from monetary and financial matters to 
health and the environment. Furthermore, these very issues have been the object of major 
controversies that have divided economists into different schools and have ultimately shaped the 
history of the discipline. While a long tradition of thought has contributed to developing 
economic models of individual behavior, dissenting groups have recurrently pointed to its neglect 
of other important motives of human action; while most economists since a very early stage have 
promoted a conception of the market as a self-adjusting social mechanism capable of 
coordinating individual actions at best, critics have often raised doubts on its merits; and while a 
majority has often supported pro–free market arguments against government intervention, the 
opposite position has sometimes prevailed. In outlining these developments, similarities and 
differences between past and present theories will be emphasized whenever possible, with the 
help of HET literature and in an effort to stress the insight that may come from both of the above-
outlined approaches. 
Further readings include classic works such as Robert Heilbroner’s (1999) The Worldly 
Philosophers, Joseph Schumpeter’s (1954) History of Economic Analysis, and Mark Blaug’s 
(1997) Economic Theory in Retrospect, together with recent reference books such as A 
Companion to the History of Economic Thought (Samuels, Biddle, & Davis, 2006) and The 
                                                                                                                                                              
1For an overview of methodological debates in HET, readers may wish to consult Weintraub 
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History of Economic Thought: A Reader (Medema & Samuels, 2003). The main scholarly 
journals in the field are History of Political Economy, European Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought, and Journal of the History of Economic Thought. The Web site of the History 
of Economics Society2 and the HET page of the New School for Social Research3 also offer 
information. Finally, Liberty Fund has republished at affordable prices many of the great books 
that have made the history of the discipline, providing some of them online at its Library of 
Economics and Liberty.4 
HET Through 1925 
Scholars in the Antiquity and the Middle Ages thought a great deal about trade, money, prices, 
and interest rates, but an autonomous discipline only developed toward the late seventeenth to 
early eighteenth centuries. The early designation of political economy, proposed by Antoine de 
Montchrestien in 1615, was later replaced by economics and refers today to a specific subfield 
only, but it has the merit of stressing a persisting feature of the discipline as a whole—namely, its 
linkages with public policy and the role of the economist as an adviser to the policy maker. This 
specificity still matters and distinguishes economics from other social sciences. 
Despite the interest of the early literature (see, e.g., Hutchison, 1988), a detailed account 
of it would be beyond the scope of this chapter, and the more traditional convention of starting 
from the late eighteenth century will be followed. Focus will be on Adam Smith (1723–1790), 
who is widely regarded as one founder of the discipline; the remainder of this section will outline 
the development of economic thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the 
emergence of the so-called classical and then the neoclassical schools. 
Adam Smith 
In his 1776 Wealth of Nations, Smith laid the foundations of what would become basic 
principles of economists’ understanding of individual behavior, the market mechanism, and the 






role of markets vis-à-vis governments. Smith was the first to explicitly characterize individual 
economic behavior as self-interested behavior, admitting that it is people’s desire for a gain that 
explains work, production, and ultimately the existence of an economic system: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of 
our own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith, 1776/1981, pp. 26–27) 
Self-interest was initially thought to be at odds with another principle that Smith had 
developed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1982)—namely, sympathy between human 
beings who, by putting themselves imaginatively in the place of others, understand their feelings 
and expectations and are moved to act accordingly (e.g., to give to those who are in need). This 
apparent contradiction, known in the literature as Das Adam Smith Problem, has been largely 
resolved by recent scholarship that has rather stressed how self-interest and sympathy emphasize 
different aspects of human nature, whose relative importance varies depending on the situation. 
They constitute two instances of a unique framework for thinking about human behavior, in 
which the individually centered, self-interested component is accompanied by an interpersonal 
dimension, so that it becomes possible to account for various forms of behavior, from trade and 
profit-seeking actions to philanthropy. Reconciliation of these two aspects of Smith’s thought 
makes him the father of economics in a broad, comprehensive sense: While the discipline was 
long viewed as the systematic analysis of the behavior of self-interested individuals, today’s 
research (especially in behavioral economics) tends to integrate forms of prosocial behavior into 
economic analysis. 
Smith’s work also contributed to shaping economists’ view of the market as a 
coordinating device in a world in which private property and freedom enable individuals to make 
self-interested decisions autonomously, without ex ante coordination by some outside (political) 
authority: The market is a social mechanism that ensures, ex post, that individual decisions are 
consistent with one another and generate an orderly result. Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor has 
often been recognized as an effective representation of this mechanism: 
by directing […] industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
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value, he [man] intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (Smith, 1776/1981, p. 
456) 
Because individuals are not isolated but part of a larger human community, their actions 
have unexpected or unintended consequences at the system level. Individuals take into account 
only their self-interest, yet their choices affect others and trigger a chain of interactions that 
eventually affect society as a whole, well beyond their original intentions. Strikingly enough, 
Smith argues that this spontaneous process does not lead to chaos but to harmony: Self-interest 
may not seem a noble motivation, yet it triggers consequences that benefit society even more than 
those arising from benevolence. Thus, there is no need for a strong state power that would impose 
social order from above, as argued by Thomas Hobbes (1651/1996). The idea of unintended 
consequences and the possible reconciliation of individual self-interest and social good, first 
articulated by Smith, have been at the core of subsequent economic reflection—which is another 
reason why Smith is credited as a founder of the discipline. 
While acknowledging the merits of the market, Smith did not deny the need for a solid 
government. In particular, he insisted that government should ensure the basic conditions that 
allow markets to function properly, primarily protection of private property and enforcement of 
contracts (Smith, 1776/1981, p. 910). The government should also be in charge of surveillance 
against what we would call today unfair competition and other abuses (Smith, 1776/1981, p. 
145). 
The Smithian Heritage and the “Classical” School 
Smith’s seminal work stimulated much reflection. On individual behavior, the idea that 
individuals act to satisfy their self-interest gradually developed into the individual optimization 
principle that is at the basis of today’s textbook microeconomics (see below). This principle has 
often been criticized as restrictive, not taking into account the multifaceted motivations that drive 
human behavior. Yet historians of economics have highlighted that in the nineteenth century, the 
economic model of individual behavior had the merit of supporting an egalitarian perspective that 
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had great impact on political debates. If the same scheme holds for all individuals, they are all 
equal and have the same capacity for decision making; observed differences, if any, depend only 
on incentives, chance, and history. This egalitarian view was shared by most economists of the 
time and strongly contrasted the (then also widespread) hierarchical stance that regarded the 
lower classes of society and supposedly “inferior” ethnic/racial groups as less capable of making 
decisions and thus in need of guidance (Peart & Levy, 2005). Interestingly, the infamous “dismal 
science” designation of political economy was originally an accusation against economists’ 
antislavery orientation, which resulted from their belief that all humans are equal (Levy, 2001). 
On the coordinating mechanism, reflection was motivated by the questions that Smith had 
left open as well as by the socioeconomic transformation brought by the Industrial Revolution. 
David Ricardo (1772–1823) provided one of the finest analyses of the relationship between prices 
and quantities; although he did not use mathematics, his compelling arguments raised the level of 
rigor in the subject and set basic standards for later modeling. His On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation (1817/2004) offers an in-depth analysis of the effects of scarcity on price 
formation. Suppose some quantity of produce (say, a ton of corn) can be obtained with a given 
amount of labor and other inputs (seeds, water, fertilizers) on a fertile land. Production of a ton of 
corn on less productive terrain requires larger amounts of inputs, so production costs are higher. 
Hence, self-interested producers will exploit fertile lands first and will extend production to lower 
quality lands only when demand is so strong that there are no spare high-quality lands to satisfy 
it. In such cases, high consumer demand pushes up the market price of corn until it covers 
production costs on the worst fields; consequently, price exceeds the cost of producing corn on 
the best fields and earns a “rent” to their landlords. While this description is highly simplified and 
does not take into account potentially relevant factors such as technological progress, it still 
allows applications to present-day natural resource economics. An example is oil, whose 
extraction costs differ in different areas, so the worst oil fields are only profitable when global 
demand is strong and prices rise. 
Prices and quantities also vary depending on the competitive conditions that prevail in a 
market. It was already known that in monopoly situations, prices are higher and quantities are 
lower than in cases in which several firms compete, but no rigorous explanation of this 
phenomenon was available until Augustin Cournot (1801–1877) with his Researches Into the 
Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (1838/1927). A pioneer of the use of 
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mathematics to guide economic reasoning in times when few did so, he illustrated how the sole 
seller of a good is able to control the entire market and hence extract a monopoly rent. In the case 
of two or more sellers, Cournot highlighted the importance of strategic interactions, so that each 
seller’s decision depends on other sellers. The market is in equilibrium when each firm’s output 
maximizes its profits given the output of other firms—a notion of equilibrium that has been 
acknowledged to prefigure that of (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in game theory. The author 
also thought that the weight of strategic interactions declines as the number of sellers increases, 
so when many of them compete, no one is capable of exerting any influence on market prices. 
Cournot was the first to prove that under competitive conditions, the quantity produced is such 
that its market price equals (what we would call today) its marginal cost. 
Economists of this time period are often referred to as “classical” economists. Other 
prominent classical writers include Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) and John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873). There have been controversies on the definition of the classical school, its timeframe, and 
scope: Smith and Ricardo are considered among its main contributors, while Cournot is less 
frequently included, although there are similarities and differences between all three. On the 
whole, these writers were mainly interested in production/supply forces, working conditions, and 
the relationship between wages and profits, while they placed relatively less emphasis on utility, 
consumption, and demand. Although Ricardo’s rent theory relied on demand to determine 
whether less productive resources could be profitably used, and Cournot went as far as to draw 
supply-and-demand diagrams, these writers did not derive demand from utility; even Cournot 
with all his mathematics regarded it only as an aggregate relationship calculable from expenditure 
data. Arguably, it is not that their arguments were underdeveloped but that the classical school 
primarily pointed to the influence of the whole economic system on individual behavior, rather 
than the other way round, and focused on the differential impact of conditions of production on 
individuals according to their position as workers, capitalists, or landowners. This viewpoint had 
the merit of calling attention to problems related to income distribution and the possible tension 
between wages and profits. 
Early nineteenth-century policy debates focused on free-market principles and the role of 
the state in countering potential negative effects of markets. One key controversy concerned 
unemployment, of which external trade was one perceived cause, to the extent that increased low-
cost imports might have resulted in national workers being displaced by cheaper foreign workers; 
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similarly, technological innovation could be conducive to displacement of workers by machines. 
Would the market mechanism self-adjust to reabsorb the workers left idle by an opening of the 
country to external trade and/or a technological shock? These questions are important for the 
well-being of a country and, since then, have recurred several times in the history of economics. 
A prominent contributor was Ricardo, who first claimed that market adjustments would be 
sufficient and then admitted that consequences for the working classes were likely to be hard, at 
least for some time—although he still believed that restraining technical progress and free trade 
would have been detrimental to the country. 
Like Ricardo, many supported free trade despite its possible inconveniencies and the need 
for government to intervene in some cases. However, this time period also saw the development 
of socialist ideas in reaction to the conditions of workers in the new industrial age and the 
classical economic thought that accompanied it. Influenced by classical authors but at the same 
time critical of them, Karl Marx (1818–1883) highlighted the internal contradictions of the 
current social relationships of production, the conflict between labor and capital, and the 
historical tendencies that brought about the modern economic system but also generated tensions 
that eventually led to its collapse. Marx’s Capital (1867) attracted many followers in economics 
and also inspired political action directed at radical social, economic, and political change. 
The Late Nineteenth Century and the “Neoclassical” (Marginalist) School 
From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, increased emphasis was put on 
consumption rather than production only, with the introduction of a notion of utility as a measure 
of individual satisfaction from the consumption of goods or services. Some reflections on utility 
had already appeared, with the idea that the problem of political economy and the ultimate 
purpose of all productive activities is to satisfy human wants at best. Yet it was long before utility 
could be fully integrated within economic models, not least because at first glance, it may have 
appeared as a subjective, qualitative notion devoid of any objective, let alone quantifiable, 
attribute. The solution came from reinterpreting utility not as an absolute but as a relative 
magnitude, varying from one individual to another and for each individual, depending on the 
available quantity of a good. One could thus distinguish the total amount of utility from 
“marginal” utility—namely, the change in the level of utility that results from a given increase in 
the quantity of the good. Marginal utility was thought to diminish with the quantity consumed, 
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reflecting the capacity of individuals to order the possible uses of successively acquired units: For 
instance, one would reserve the first gallons of water for drinking and the successive ones for 
personal hygiene, for housekeeping, and finally for watering plants. In passing, this assumption 
solved what earlier thinkers considered a paradox—the fact that useful goods such as water or air 
have low market value: The reason is their abundance, which means that the last increment in 
quantity generates an extremely small increase in utility. These results suggested an interpretation 
of self-interested behavior in terms of attempts to raise one’s utility to its highest possible level 
and were obtained independently, in 1871–1874, by William S. Jevons (1835–1882) in Britain, 
Carl Menger (1840–1921) in Austria, and Léon Walras (1834–1910) in Switzerland. 
The importance of thinking in terms of marginal variations rather than total magnitudes 
proved so useful to account for utility and demand that it was subsequently extended to supply. In 
fact, notions of marginal productivity and marginal cost of production, as opposed to total 
productivity/cost, had already been introduced (e.g., by Cournot) but were refined and 
generalized in the 1890s by, among others, John B. Clark (1847–1938), Philip H. Wicksteed 
(1844–1927), and Knut Wicksell (1851–1926). Marginal reasoning seemed so important that the 
economic thought of this time period is often referred to as marginalism. 
Accounts of the market mechanism of this time period place emphasis on the symmetry of 
supply-and-demand factors and on the resulting equilibrium. Individual demand and supply are 
derived, respectively, from agents’ calculations of utility (for consumers) and profit/cost (for 
firms), and market supply and demand are obtained by aggregating all individual values. When 
market supply equals demand, the market is in equilibrium—that is, the decisions of all 
households and all firms are consistent with one another. These common traits can be combined 
with different assumptions to give rise to various models of the market. Alfred Marshall (1842–
1924) is renowned for developing a “partial equilibrium” approach, focusing on the study of a 
single competitive market and illustrated with the help of price-quantity diagrams in which 
demand decreases and supply increases with price. The intersection of the supply-and-demand 
schedules identifies equilibrium—a price at which supply equals demand and the market clears 
(Marshall, 1920). The partial equilibrium approach provides a tractable framework to study the 
relationship between price and quantity; however, it is based on the restrictive assumption that 
changes in the price of a good have repercussions on the quantity of that good only, ruling out the 
possibility that a variation in the price of a good will have an impact on the demand and supply of 
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substitutes and/or complements. Hence, it can be taken at most as an approximation, not as a 
rigorous analytical device. In contrast, interdependencies among markets were a key concern for 
Walras (1874/1977), who tried to model agents who allocate their budgets to the purchase of 
multiple goods so that changes in the market price and/or quantity of one good are likely to have 
repercussions on the markets for other goods. His notion of “general equilibrium” is directly 
derived from this view and corresponds to a situation in which supply equals demand on each 
market, so that all clear simultaneously. 
A closely related, though distinct, question is whether and how actual trade practices will 
drive prices and quantities toward equilibrium. Again, Marshall and Walras provided different 
answers. Walras (1874/1977) proposed a model of auctions in which at given prices, all traders 
declare the quantity of each good that they wish to buy or sell at those prices; if with these 
quantities, supply equals demand on each market, then this is the general equilibrium and trade 
takes place; if not, prices are adjusted in such a way that they diminish where supply exceeds 
demand and increase in the opposite case; at the new set of prices, traders announce again the 
quantities that they wish to buy or sell, and the process (which he labeled tâtonnement, a term 
still used in the literature) starts again, until equilibrium is reached. In short, transactions take 
place simultaneously, at equilibrium only, so that the same prices apply to all traders. Instead, 
Marshall (1920) had in mind a sequence of bilateral transactions on a single market, in which 
each pair of traders negotiates a price and each transaction withdraws some units from the market 
so that lesser quantities are available for later trades—in other words, the conditions under which 
traders negotiate are altered at every step. Such changes gradually dampen price adjustments until 
they reach the level that corresponds to the intersection of supply and demand. Here, transactions 
occur sequentially, in disequilibrium, at prices that may differ from a pair of traders to the other. 
Is there continuity or rupture between the classical school of thought and the 
marginalist—also known as “neoclassical”? The emergence of the latter current of thought used 
to be referred to in HET as a “revolution,” thus suggesting a major change, which some argue is 
primarily due to the postulated symmetry between supply-and-demand conditions rather than to 
the use of marginal concepts, yet important features of neoclassical thought and elements of 
reflection on utility and demand were anticipated by earlier authors. Today’s HET scholars 
mostly believe that there was no such thing as a sudden transformation of the discipline but a 
long, slow transition; key marginalist concepts appeared early, but it took long before they were 
 13
systematized into a coherent, comprehensive framework. In turn, neoclassical economics does 
not constitute a single theory but rather a family of approaches: The market models of Marshall 
and Walras are examples of such differences. 
Openness to more rigorous thinking and increased use of mathematics have been often 
thought to characterize neoclassical theories; an indication of this tendency is the renaming of the 
discipline in the late nineteenth century from political economy to economics, primarily at the 
initiative of Marshall. However, qualifications should be introduced to the extent that some 
earlier writers such as Cournot had already used some mathematical tools in their analysis 
(Theocharis, 1993); conversely, late nineteenth-century economists were not unanimous on the 
desirability of using mathematics, and Marshall himself limited his quantitative expressions to a 
minimum. It took long before the use of mathematics became standard in the profession, and 
debates on the legitimacy of using mathematical tools in the study of human behavior and society 
have been recurrent since then. 
HET Since 1925 
This section outlines the development of neoclassical economics in the twentieth century, with 
focus on its two hallmarks of individual optimization and market equilibrium. The section also 
includes an overview of the emergence of macroeconomics and how it gradually came to 
incorporate the principles of optimization and equilibrium. 
Neoclassical Economics: Individual Optimization and Market Equilibrium 
The neoclassical concept of utility was refined over time, and mathematical models of 
utility maximization under a budget constraint saw the light. Progressively, the constrained 
maximization model was extended to the study of all individual decision units, on both the 
demand and the supply side of the market, and became the basis of all analyses of individual 
economic behavior. It gradually came to be understood as rational behavior—choosing the best 
possible means to achieve one’s ends. This opened the way to a conception of economics based 
on two pillars: optimizing behavior of agents (both consumers and firms with, respectively, utility 
and profit as objective functions) and equilibrium of markets. The contribution of Paul 
Samuelson (born 1915) was essential to these developments and mainly consisted in rewriting 
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many problems of economics as maximization problems, with extensive use of mathematics. 
From the 1940s onwards, Samuelson’s effort to show that apparently diverse subjects have the 
same underlying structure and can be treated with the same mathematical tools gave 
unprecedented unity and coherence to the discipline. 
The optimization model has not been beyond dispute, though: At least since the 1950s, 
Herbert Simon (1916–2001) and others contended that actual decision makers lack the cognitive 
capacities to solve maximization problems and rather content themselves with “satisficing” 
behavior, choosing options that are not optimal but make them happy enough. Along these lines, 
they developed a “bounded rationality” approach as an alternative to the seemingly strong 
rationality requirements of the individual maximization model. 
Regarding market models, Marshall’s partial equilibrium approach continued to be used 
in applied economic studies, but it was the general equilibrium model that most attracted the 
attention of economic theorists during this time period. Its extraordinary development after World 
War II was largely due to the introduction into economics of highly advanced mathematical tools 
and of a new way of thinking about mathematics (Weintraub, 2002a). The new tools allowed for 
a sophisticated refinement of Walras’s approach, named the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model 
after its main contributors. A major achievement in the 1950s was a formal proof of existence of 
equilibrium. The difficulty was that it was not enough to show that the system of simultaneous 
equations representing equality between supply and demand in all markets has a solution: For this 
solution to be meaningful economically and not only mathematically, it was also necessary to 
prove that equilibrium prices and quantities are nonnegative. By demonstrating that it is indeed 
the case, it was established that the notion of a set of prices that clear all markets is consistent 
(i.e., that the notion of equilibrium of a system of interrelated competitive markets is not void). 
Another success for general equilibrium theory was the mathematical proof of the so-
called two theorems of welfare economics—a modern reinterpretation of Smith’s “invisible 
hand.” The first theorem states that a general equilibrium corresponds to a socially optimal 
allocation of resources, and the second states that, under some conditions, any socially optimal 
allocation of resources can be sustainable by a general equilibrium. These results shaped policy 
discussions for long: They amounted to rigorously establishing the properties of the free-market 
mechanism that earlier economists had put forward intuitively—namely, the idea that a market-
based solution to the problem of allocating scarce resources produces a desirable outcome for all 
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and cannot be superseded by any other alternative. The two theorems made a strong case for the 
free market but also enabled clear identification of cases where government intervention is 
legitimate: Whenever the assumptions that support the two theorems (e.g., competitive 
conditions) are not met, the market may fail to yield efficient outcomes (“market failures”), and 
the government should step in. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, such progresses put the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model at the 
center of the stage and increased confidence in its potential to provide the whole of economics 
with rigorous mathematical foundations. However, problems started with attempts at proving two 
other key properties of equilibrium—namely, stability and uniqueness. The question of stability 
was meant to ensure that after an exogenous shock, the market mechanism is capable of 
generating endogenous forces that bring it back to equilibrium; if equilibrium exists but the 
market cannot find it, then arguments for free markets are harder to make. In addition, if 
uniqueness is not guaranteed, it is unclear where an adjustment process might drive the system 
after a shock; besides, some equilibriums may be unstable. It became soon clear, though, that 
formal proofs of stability and uniqueness could be obtained only under very restrictive, 
unrealistic assumptions. Critics stressed that these results reveal that with all its mathematical 
underpinnings, general equilibrium theory did not truly succeed in improving knowledge of how 
the market mechanism works and how prices adjust in response to variations of supply-and-
demand conditions (Ingrao & Israel, 1990). Today the theory is still part of economists’ 
education, but research in this field has entered a phase of relative decline. 
Keynes and the Emergence of Macroeconomics 
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, macroeconomics also entered the scene. John 
Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), one of the fathers of the new approach, is among the most 
influential economists of the twentieth century. His General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936/1997) proposed a new way to look at economic systems, one that placed emphasis 
on quantity adjustments at given prices, rather than on the supposed capacity of price adjustments 
to equilibrate markets, and focused on aggregate relationships rather than on individual behavior. 
The new approach was rooted in the belief that the macrolevel of analysis differs in nature from 
the microlevel and contented itself with the use of simple behavioral assumptions that do not 
require optimization: Consumers spend a fraction of their income and save the remaining part, 
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and firms’ investment decisions depend inversely on the interest rate. In this way, it hoped to 
tackle the question of unemployment that was crucial at the time. The neoclassical conception 
was ill-suited to explain why some people could be involuntarily unemployed for long: It 
regarded labor as hardly different from any other good, so that market price adjustments should 
in principle bring the system back to its full-employment equilibrium after a temporary shock. In 
contrast, Keynes stressed the specificity of labor relative to other goods and suggested that the 
level of employment may depend less on prices than on aggregate demand (i.e., the total 
expenses of an economic system). In this perspective, an economy may be unable to deliver full 
employment, even if all markets for goods clear in the long run: Underemployment may be its 
normal state. In this sense, the book challenged the idea that markets are capable of self-
regulation and built a theoretical framework that legitimated increased government intervention 
to stimulate the economy. Policy measures could take various forms, ranging from increased 
public spending to lower interest rates to encourage investments and thus raise demand for labor. 
The book had enormous success and changed the way economists and policy makers 
looked at the role of governments in a market economy: Not only did it inspire a significant 
amount of research work, but it was also at the basis of economic policies in Western countries 
after World War II, so it is sometimes referred to as a Keynesian “revolution.” Policies of 
demand stimulation along Keynesian lines were enhanced by the parallel development of 
macroeconometric techniques that made it possible to assess the state of an economic system and 
to estimate the impact of government interventions. 
However, the neoclassical approach was not completely abandoned, and in particular, a 
group of economists tried to reconcile it with Keynes’s view. A hallmark of this tendency is the 
model known as IS-LM, designed in 1937 by John Hicks (1904–1989) to represent key principles 
of the General Theory in the form of a system of simultaneous equations reminiscent of those of 
general equilibrium theory. Indeed, the model succeeded in capturing some major aspects of 
Keynes’s thought, but at the same time, its partly neoclassical roots made it less suited to account 
for the possible existence of unemployment in an economy that is otherwise in equilibrium. 
Later, the IS-LM model was enlarged to take into account international transactions (the so-called 
Mundell-Fleming model) and was accompanied by a Phillips curve that explained the behavior of 
prices on the basis of an inverse relationship between inflation and the level of employment. 
Starting in the mid-1950s, a consensus emerged around this approach at least in the United States, 
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where it constituted a basis for descriptive economic analysis and for policy advice. It coexisted 
with neoclassical microeconomics and became known as the neoclassical synthesis, a designation 
commonly attributed to Samuelson. 
Keynesianism came under attack after the 1973 oil crisis and the ensuing nasty 
combination of inflation and unemployment for which it seemed to have no remedies: Demand 
policies would reduce unemployment but would lead to higher inflation, while public expense 
cuts would tame inflation but would raise unemployment. This period saw the rise of an 
alternative approach, known as monetarism and primarily associated with Milton Friedman 
(1912–2006). Monetarism revived the pre-Keynesian belief that market economies can regulate 
themselves without any need for government intervention and brought to light a strong 
relationship between money creation and inflation, so that an economy may be destabilized if the 
authorities print too much money: It followed that the focus of economic policies should be 
solely on keeping the quantity of money under control and that active demand policies are 
useless, if not even damaging. Monetarism spread widely in the early 1980s and had a strong 
influence on policy making. Keynesian ideas did not completely vacate the scene, though: Many 
became convinced that government policies can still have a temporary effect and that the 
Keynesian framework of analysis holds in the short run, while the monetarist framework holds in 
the long run. 
This compromise was challenged by Robert Lucas (born 1937), who made a strong case 
for unifying the foundations of economic theory through an extension to macroeconomics of the 
microeconomic assumptions of rational behavior of individuals and of the self-equilibrating 
capacity of markets. Agents make optimal choices: In particular, they form expectations about the 
state of the economy by taking into account all available information and by processing it in the 
best possible way, so that they can be called “rational expectations.” More precisely, agents make 
consumption or investment decisions that take into account the model of the economy as well as 
government policies, so that they reach equilibrium immediately and their expectations are 
validated. If all agents behave in this way, the economy is always in equilibrium. A major 
implication of this view is that economic policies are ineffective even in the short run because 
they are anticipated by agents and are accounted for in their decisions. Only unexpected policies 
that take individuals by surprise can move the economy from one state to the other—but this 
means that to be effective, policies must be occasional and unsystematic or else they will be 
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detected, so the scope for governments to steer the economy becomes extremely limited. A 
consequence of this view is the invalidity of macroeconometric models that purported to evaluate 
the effects of public policies with the help of aggregate data: If agents take into account policies 
in their decision making, their behavior is not policy invariant so that existing observations may 
not predict future choices well. Only a sophisticated model of how individuals make optimal 
decisions based on their expectations can offer reliable predictions. 
The rational expectations school of thought tried to give greater coherence to the 
discipline by basing both micro- and macrotheories on the two main pillars of individual 
optimization and market equilibrium. This choice responded to a widespread demand for more 
rigorous economic theorizing but also reflected renewed confidence in the functioning of the 
free-market mechanism and skepticism with regard to government intervention; in this sense, it 
represents a comeback to pre-Keynesian attitudes. Since then, most developments of 
macroeconomics have reflected this tendency—with the development, among other things, of the 
real business cycles approach by Finn E. Kydland and Edward Prescott in the 1980s. 
While the great majority of macroeconomists have now recognized the need to firmly 
ground macroeconomic theorizing on sound microeconomic foundations, many disagree with the 
pro–free market orientation of these currents and have tried to develop alternative approaches that 
would still be based on rigorous microfoundations but would lead to Keynesian results, most 
prominently by showing the possibility for unemployment to persist in an equilibrium economy. 
These approaches, commonly referred to as New Keynesian, have brought to light characteristics 
of the economy that might lead to this result, ranging from implicit contracts, efficiency wages, 
and coordination failures to imperfect competition. An overview and an appreciation of their 
contributions are provided in De Vroey (2004). 
Over time, a consensus gradually has been established around general equilibrium theory 
and macroeconomics with rigorous microfoundations, which have come to be identified as the 
core of the discipline—what some now call “mainstream” economics. They are now at the basis 
of economics education and constitute a reference for the profession as a whole. Since their 
introduction, training in these fields has contributed to raise the level of rigor in economics 
reasoning and to spread the use of mathematical and quantitative tools. 
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History of Recent Economics 
Research in mainstream economics is still active, even if there has been a relative decline in 
recent years. This has paralleled a tendency to increasing diversification of approaches, methods, 
and topics, which has seemingly reversed the twentieth-century trend toward unification of the 
different parts of the discipline. Still, economists tend to have in common an enduring emphasis 
on mathematical tools and formal reasoning. 
A detailed account of the different emerging approaches to economics would be beyond 
the scope of this brief account of HET, but more information can be found in other chapters in 
this handbook. This section instead will provide an overview some significant developments and 
how they are challenging established knowledge in economics. 
Models of rational behavior have put the accent on the strategic dimension of rationality, 
in situations where agents make decisions whose success depends on the choices of others. This 
shift in emphasis results from the rise of game theory as a challenger to established 
microeconomics, which has been spectacular in recent years even though the origins of the theory 
date back to (at least) the 1940s. Applications of game theory include bargaining, imperfect 
competition, and questions at the interface between economics and other sciences, such as social 
network formation, the emergence of social norms, and voting systems. 
Assumptions of individual rationality do not go unquestioned, though. The stream of 
research that is known as “behavioral economics” has provided substantial evidence that humans 
often violate some implications of optimization models and has tried to develop more realistic 
psychological approaches to the study of individual behavior. Some researchers, in particular, 
have focused on how happiness and individual satisfaction, as well as prosocial and cooperative 
attitudes, may be important determinants of individual behavior that were not fully accounted for 
in older maximization models. To do so, new sources of information have been exploited, notably 
experimentation and analysis of survey data with the help of increasingly sophisticated 
microeconometric techniques. While these fields have remained marginal for a while, they are 
now recognized parts of the discipline and attract an increasing number of young economists. 
Models of the market have been greatly enriched by a detailed study of auctions and other 
mechanisms of allocating goods. Part of the motivation for these studies in the 1990s and early 
2000s was the need to design trading mechanisms that would help governments to privatize 
companies, infrastructures, and other facilities that they previously owned. To some extent, 
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economists’ work in this area resembles that of engineers at the service of the government—a 
new role that, however, still renews with the time-honored image of the political economist as an 
adviser to the policy maker. These studies depart from the general equilibrium tradition in a 
double sense: First, they highlight the importance of trading institutions to yield socially desirable 
outcomes, instead of abstracting them away, and second, they signal a tendency to focus less on 
interdependencies and rather concentrate on single markets—what Marshall modeled in a “partial 
equilibrium” perspective. 
At the macrolevel, greater emphasis has been placed on economic governance. The 
conditions under which governments can ensure protection of property rights and enforcement of 
contracts, already emphasized by Smith as key requirements for market economies to function 
properly, have been studied in greater depth from the 1990s onwards. Focus on governance and 
institutions sometimes accompanies criticisms of pro-free-market principles but sometimes 
supports the free-market tradition of thought by providing a more precise definition of how the 
government can create conditions for markets to function properly. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, it can be said that the discipline advances over time with the progressive 
introduction of new tools, new approaches, and an improved understanding of key concepts. Yet 
some questions are recurrent and constitute some of the great, unresolved dilemmas of 
contemporary society. This chapter has emphasized the problems of individual economic 
behavior, the functioning of the market mechanisms, and the place of the market vis-à-vis the 
government. The answers provided at different epochs, though based on different arguments and 
different sources of evidence, often have elements in common—partly because these are issues 
that have major philosophical and political implications. By accounting for the circumstances in 
which a variety of responses have emerged in the past, HET can contribute to today’s reflection 
on these issues. As Keynes once wrote, 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, 
the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be 
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some 
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defunct economist. (Keynes, 1936, p. 383) 
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